F.I.F.A. – Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2013-2014) – controversie allenatori – ———- F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee (2013-2014) – coach disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of theSingle Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 28 August 2013, by Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the Football Association of country W as “Claimant” against the coach Coach Z, from country R as “Respondent” regarding a contractual dispute arisen between the parties.

F.I.F.A. - Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2013-2014) – controversie allenatori – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Players' Status Committee (2013-2014) – coach disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of theSingle Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 28 August 2013, by Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the Football Association of country W as “Claimant” against the coach Coach Z, from country R as “Respondent” regarding a contractual dispute arisen between the parties. I. Facts of the case 1. On 1 July 2010, the Football Association of country W (hereinafter: the Claimant) and the coach Z from country R (hereinafter: the Respondent) signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract), valid from 1 July 2010 until 30 June 2012 and according to which the Respondent was appointed by the Claimant as “Coach for National Football Team of country W”. 2. According to article 3 of the contract, the Respondent was entitled to an annual basic salary of USD 500,000, “payable in equal instalments at the end of each regular Monthly pay Period”. 3. Additionally, article 3 of the contract mentioned that “The First Party [i.e. the Claimant] agrees to pay the Second Party [i.e. the Respondent] upon date of commencement of contract of this contract the sum of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.000). An amount One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) Six Months after Commencement of this Contract”. 4. Furthermore, article 4 par. 1 of the contract provided that “Any contractual party deciding to terminate this contract on a unilateral basis at any time during the duration of the contract, is committed to pay the sum of monthly salaries of the remaining period of the contract, or a three-month’s salary. Payment is to be done according to the lesser of the two amounts”. 5. In addition, article 8 of the contract stipulated as follows: “In the case of a dispute relating to the interpretation or execution of this contract, the dispute shall be settled in accordance with the Laws of FIFA”. 6. On 7 September 2011, the Claimant lodged a complaint with FIFA against the Respondent, claiming that the latter had unilaterally terminated his employment contract. 7. In this respect, the Claimant claimed that although the Respondent had received the sum of USD 150,000 according to article 3 of the contract, “shortly after the signing the contract, the coach in question left country W in the pursuit of another job opportunity” and that “the coach had left the country, promising to transfer the penalty amount (three-month’s salary)” according to article 4 par. 1 of the contract. 8. The Claimant further stated that although it had requested the Respondent several times to proceed with the payment of USD 125,000 based on article 4 par. 1 of the contract, the latter had failed to pay the requested amount. In support of its allegations, the Claimant provided three letters addressed to the Respondent, dated 23 February 2011, 8 May 2011 and 13 July 2011, in which the Claimant requested said payment. 9. Consequently, the Claimant claimed from the Respondent the total amount of USD 243,915.34 “as a combination of his basic one month salary and the advance on the payment”. 10. In his reply of 4 February 2013, the Respondent rejected the allegations of the Claimant in their entirety and claimed, first of all, that FIFA should not be competent to hear the present dispute. 11. In this respect, the Respondent explained that according to article 8 of the contract, the parties had only agreed that the “Laws of FIFA” should be applicable, but stated that the parties had not explicitly agreed that FIFA should be competent to decide on the dispute at hand. 12. The Respondent further alleged that due to the subsidiary character of article 22 lit c) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, FIFA should only be competent if no independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings exists at national level. In this regard, the Respondent argued that in country R such tribunal exists and therefore, any claim in relation to the contract should have been lodged in country R. 13. Furthermore, the Respondent argued that the application of article 22 lit c) of the aforementioned Regulations is restricted to employment-related disputes but since the Claimant was claiming, according to the Respondent, an exorbitant compensation, which should not be considered as a typical employment-related dispute, FIFA shall not be competent to hear the case. 14. Consequently, the Respondent requested FIFA to reject the claim, based on lack of jurisdiction. 15. Notwithstanding the above, the Respondent responded to the arguments raised by the Claimant and argued that article 4 par. 1 of the contract would not apply to the situation in question since the contract had been terminated on the basis of an oral and mutual agreement between the president of the Claimant and himself. 16. In this respect, the Respondent explained that prior to a game the National Team of the Claimant was supposed to play in country L, he had requested the Claimant to terminate the contract due to the insecure political situation in country L, a termination which had allegedly been accepted by the latter. The Respondent further alleged that he had even held a press conference together with the president of the Claimant informing about the mutual termination of their contractual relationship and stated that such a press conference would never have been held if he had terminated the contract unilaterally. 17. On account of all the above, the Respondent requested FIFA to reject the claim. II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter also simply referred to as: the Single Judge) analysed which Procedural Rules were applicable to the matter at hand. In this respect, he referred to art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2012) and acknowledged that the present dispute was submitted to FIFA on 7 September 2011, thus before the aforementioned rules entered into force (1 December 2012). Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) was applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the 2012 and 2010 editions of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and, on the other hand, to the fact that the claim was lodged in front of FIFA on 7 September 2011. In view of the foregoing, the Single Judge concluded that the 2010 edition of the FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the case in hand as to the substance. 3. The applicable regulations having been established, the Single Judge went on to assess whether he was competent to hear the present matter and recalled that the Respondent had argued in his submissions that FIFA was not competent to deal with the dispute due to a lack of jurisdiction since the parties had not explicitly agreed that FIFA should be competent to decide on the dispute at hand but only agreed that the “Laws of FIFA” should be applicable. 4. In this context, the Single Judge turned his attention to art. 8 of the employment contract which stipulates as follows: “In the case of a dispute relating to the interpretation or execution of this contract, the dispute shall be settled in accordance with the Laws of FIFA”. 5. In this respect, the Single Judge referred to art. 22 c) of the Regulations which stipulates that FIFA is competent to hear “employment-related disputes between a club or an association and a coach of an international dimension, unless an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings exists at national level”, as well as to FIFA’s circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005, and noted that the Respondent had not provided any evidence which would have proved his allegations and that therefore it could not be established that there existed at national level an independent arbitration tribunal which complied with the requirements of FIFA. 6. In addition, the Single Judge was keen to underline that the parties had not agreed on an explicit arbitration-clause allowing a particular arbitration tribunal to be the competent body in case of a dispute between them. On the basis of the aforementioned, the Single Judge concluded that the Respondent’s objection to the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected. 7. Consequently, the Single Judge confirmed that, on the basis of art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules in connection with art. 23 par. 1 and 3 as well as art. 22 c) of the Regulations, he was competent to deal with the present matter since it concerned an employment-related dispute between the Football Association of country W and an coach Z. 8. His competence and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Single Judge started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties throughout the proceedings. 9. In this respect, and first of all, the Single Judge remarked that the parties had concluded a two-year employment contract dated 1 July 2010, according to which, the Respondent was entitled to receive an annual basic salary of USD 500,000, “payable in equal instalments at the end of each regular Monthly pay Period”. 10. In addition, the Single Judge underlined that the contract contained a specific termination clause which read as follows: “Any contractual party deciding to terminate this contract on a unilateral basis at any time during the duration of the contract, is committed to pay the sum of monthly salaries of the remaining period of the contract, or a three-month’s salary. Payment is to be done according to the lesser of the two amounts”. 11. Having acknowledged the above, the Single Judge noted that while the Claimant had argued that the contract had been unilaterally terminated by the Respondent, the latter had alleged that an oral and mutual termination agreement had been agreed between the parties. 12. In light of the above, the Single Judge deemed that the first question to be addressed in the present matter was whether the contract had been terminated unilaterally by the Respondent or if it had been terminated by a mutual termination agreement between the parties. 13. Before doing so, the Single Judge was keen to recall the content of article 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules according to which “any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof”. In other words, only allegations supported by clear evidence can be taken into consideration by the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee. 14. In this respect and in view of the submissions of both parties, the Single Judge took note that shortly after signing the contract, the Respondent had put an end to the contractual relationship with the Claimant by leaving the country W and that such a fact had never been questioned by any of the parties during the course of the present proceedings. 15. In this context, the Single Judge deemed that since the early termination of the contract was not questioned by any of the parties, it should have been the responsibility of the Respondent to provide documentary evidence to prove that the parties had ended their contractual relationship by mutual consent. 16. In this regard, and while noting that the Respondent had not provided any evidence in support of his allegations, the Single Judge expressed the view that the Respondent had failed to demonstrate that the contract had been terminated on the basis of an oral and mutual agreement between the president of the Claimant and the Respondent himself. 17. Consequently, and in the absence of any proof pursuant to article 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules which would have proved that the parties had ended their contractual relationship by mutual consent, the Single Judge concluded that it has to be assumed that the contract had been terminated unilaterally by the Respondent. 18. Additionally, and taking into consideration the abovementioned, the Single Judge recalled the content of art. 4 par. 1 of the contract, according to which the possibility of a premature unilateral termination of the contract was contractually foreseen and pointed out that, consequently, according to said article, the contract could have been terminated on a unilateral basis subject to the condition that the party deciding to unilaterally terminate the contract pays “the sum of monthly salaries of the remaining period of the contract, or a three-month’s salary” whichever was lower. 19. Bearing in mind the aforementioned and taking into account that no evidence about a mutual termination agreement was provided, the Single Judge concluded that the contract had been terminated unilaterally by the Respondent in the sense of article 4 par. 1 of the contract and that the Claimant should therefore be entitled to the compensation provided under said article of the contract. 20. Having established the above-mentioned, the Single Judge proceeded to the calculation of the compensation. In this respect, he was keen to underline that, in particular, the Respondent had terminated their contractual relationship shortly after signing the contract and therefore concluded that the Respondent had to pay the Claimant “the sum of (…) a three-month’s salary”, i.e. USD 125,000. 21. In view of the above and in accordance with the general principle of pacta sunt servanda, which in essence means that agreements must be respected by the parties in good faith, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent must fulfil the obligation he voluntarily entered into with the Claimant by means of the contract signed between the parties, and therefore, the Respondent in accordance with article 4 par. 1 of the contract must pay to the Claimant the amount of USD 125,000 corresponding to a “three-month’s salary” agreed upon for the termination of the contract on an unilateral basis. 22. After having established the aforementioned, the Single Judge went on to deal with the second part of the Claimant’s claim, i.e. its request for the reimbursement of part of the sum of USD 150,000 paid to the Respondent on the basis of article 3 of the contract at the beginning of the contract. 23. In this respect, the Single Judge, first and foremost noted that according to the contract concluded between the parties, the Respondent was inter alia entitled to receive from the Claimant “upon date of commencement of contract of this contract the sum of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.000)”. 24. In this context, the Single Judge was keen to emphasise that said amount had not been contractually agreed as part of the salary and had therefore to be considered as a “signing-on fee”. Therefore, the Single Judge decided to reject this additional part of the claim. 25. In view of all of the above, the Single Judge concluded that the Claimant’s claim against the Respondent is partially accepted and that, consequently, the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant the total amount of USD 125,000 as compensation for the unilateral termination of the contract by the Respondent. 26. The Single Judge concluded his deliberations by establishing that any further claims lodged by the Claimant are rejected. 27. Finally, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which, in proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee including its Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of CHF 25,000 are levied. The relevant provision further states that the costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and are normally to be paid by the unsuccessful party. 28. In respect of the above and taking into account that the claim of the Claimant has been partially accepted, the Single Judge concluded that both parties have to bear the costs of the current proceedings before FIFA. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. On that basis, the Single Judge held that the amount to be taken into consideration in the present proceedings is over CHF 200,000. Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 25,000. 29. In conclusion, in view of the circumstances of the present matter and taking into account that the matter did not pose any particular factual difficulty, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of CHF 10,000. Consequently and since the claim has been partially accepted, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee decided that the amount of CHF 5,000 has to be paid by the Claimant and the amount of CHF 5,000 by the Respondent in order to cover the costs of the proceedings. III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. The claim of the Claimant, the Football Association of country W, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant, the Football Association of country W, is partially accepted. 3. The Respondent, Coach Z, has to pay to the Claimant, the Football Association of country W, the amount of USD 125,000, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision. 4. Any further claims lodged by the Claimant, the Football Association of country W, are rejected. 5. If the aforementioned amount of USD 125,000, is not paid within the aforementioned deadline, an interest rate of 5% will apply as from the expiry of the fixed time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 6. The Claimant, the Football Association of country W, is directed to inform the Respondent, coach Z, immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance under point 3 above is to be made and to notify the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received. 7. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 10,000 are to be paid to FIFA by both parties, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision, as follows: 7.1. The amount of CHF 5,000 has to be paid by the Claimant, the Football Association of country W. Given that the latter already paid an advance of costs in the amount of CHF 4,000 at the start of the present proceedings, the Claimant, the Football Association of country W, has to pay the remaining amount of CHF 1,000 to FIFA. 7.2. The amount of CHF 5,000 has to be paid by the Respondent, coach Z, to FIFA. 7.3. The abovementioned two payments have to be paid to the following bank account with reference to case nr. xxxxxxxxx: ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to article 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne, Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee Markus Kattner Deputy Secretary General Encl. CAS Directives